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United States Supreme Court Survey:
2018 Term
Iancu v. Brunetti: Free Speech Meets
“Immoral and Scandalous”
Trademarks in the Supreme Court
Niki Kuckes*

In 1968, Paul Robert Cohen walked down the hallway of the
Los Angeles Courthouse wearing a jacket that bore the words “Fuck
the Draft.” 1 He wore the jacket to express his strong opposition to
the Vietnam War. For the simple act of wearing a jacket bearing a
profane message in a place where women and children were
present, Mr. Cohen was criminally charged and convicted of
disturbing the peace by engaging in “offensive” behavior. 2 The case
ultimately landed in the Supreme Court of the United States (the
Court). The Court agreed that the profanity chosen by Mr. Cohen
to express his message was “crude,” “distasteful,” “scurrilous,” and
“unseemly.” 3 Mr. Cohen had chosen to use a four-letter word that
was “more distasteful than most others of its genre.” 4 But Mr.
Cohen’s peaceful display of his “Fuck the Draft” jacket, the Court
held, was speech protected by the First Amendment’s free speech
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
Id.
See id. at 21–25.
Id. at 25.
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guarantee, not simply in its anti-war message but also in the mode
Cohen chose to express that message. 5
There was no question that Mr. Cohen had the First
Amendment right to express his political opposition to the Vietnam
War. The question, rather, was whether the government could
regulate his use of profanity as his means of expressing this
message. 6 On this point, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the
notion that the States, “acting as guardians of public morality,” may
properly remove offensive words from the public vocabulary in
order to maintain “what they regard as a suitable level of discourse
within the body politic” 7 or to protect the sensibilities of members
of the public.8 In what may be the most famous quote from Cohen,
the Court observed, “it is . . . often true that one man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric.” 9 It is because government officials cannot make
“principled distinctions” in this area that the First Amendment
leaves such matters of expression to individuals. 10 Cohen’s
conviction was invalidated.
The government’s power to burden speech because the speaker
has chosen to use words that offend public sensibilities is once again
the subject of a recent Court First Amendment decision.11
Ironically, it was the very same four-letter word of profanity used
in Cohen that led to the Court’s First Amendment decision in Iancu
v. Brunetti, issued at the end of the Court’s October 2018 Term.12
Almost fifty years after the Court issued its Cohen decision
protecting Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket, the Court was
called upon to rule on whether the government could bar a
trademark owner from federally registering “FUCT” as the brand
for his clothing line. 13 While the context is different—and much
First Amendment law has developed in the interim—the
arguments in the two cases bear a strikingly similarity.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 25.
Id.
See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
Id. at 2297.
Id. at 2297.
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In Iancu v. Brunetti, as noted, the First Amendment
controversy arose from Mr. Brunetti’s efforts to federally register
the trademark “FUCT” for his clothing line. 14 Using its statutory
power to reject marks that it deems “immoral [or] scandalous,” the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to
register the mark. 15 To defend the PTO’s actions, the government
insisted, in echoes of Cohen, that government officials may properly
be given broad power to deny a legal status to trademarks it deems
“disgraceful,” “offensive,” “disreputable,” or “vulgar” without
running afoul of the First Amendment.16
The case might seem to present a straightforward application
of the Cohen principles. In 1971, the Supreme Court readily saw
the “shortcomings” of a position that would allow government
officials to punish peaceful speech expressed in expletives or other
offensive words in order to “maintain what they regard as a suitable
level of discourse within the body politic.” 17 But in the intervening
years since the Cohen decision, the Court has spilled a great deal of
ink issuing First Amendment free speech decisions. The dizzying
array of First Amendment principles and caveats adopted in the
interim made Iancu more difficult than the logical, intuitive, and
eloquent application of the comparable principle in the Cohen case.
Indeed, its Iancu decision was not the first time the Court
struggled with virtually the same First Amendment issue. Two
terms earlier, the Court took up a First Amendment challenge to a
closely related statutory bar under the Lanham Act—a bar on the
registration of trademarks that “disparage” persons or groups—in
Matal v. Tam. 18 In that case, the Court struck that provision down
unanimously without reaching an opinion representing a majority
14. Id. The Court had little difficulty in perceiving Mr. Brunetti’s
alternative spelling of “FUCT” as the “equivalent of [the] past participle form
of a well-known word of profanity.” Id.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (providing that the PTO may refuse
registration to trademarks that include or consist of “immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter”). There is no dispute with respect to the constitutionality
of the PTO’s power to refuse registration to “deceptive” trademarks. Iancu
concerned the rest of this clause (the statutory bar on registering “immoral . . .
or scandalous” marks). Rather than treating the two adjectives separately, the
PTO has long applied this as a “unitary provision.” See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at
2298.
16. See id.
17. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).
18. See 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).
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of the Court.19 I previously wrote on the Court’s inability in Matal
v. Tam to agree on any single First Amendment lens through which
to analyze the statutory bar in that case and the missed opportunity
to make a clear and powerful statement of First Amendment law. 20
Given a second chance to revisit the same statutory provision,
the Court has now rallied in Iancu to garner both a convincing
majority and a single rationale to support its conclusion that a
statutory bar on registering “immoral or scandalous” trademarks
cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Ultimately, the
modern Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that the Court
had so easily come to in 1971, that a “law disfavoring ‘ideas that
offend’” violates the First Amendment. 21 This result is hardly
surprising; it should be self-evident that government officials
cannot, as a constitutional matter, be given power to decide that
private speech is “immoral or scandalous” and should be banned,
burdened or punished on that ground.
While the Iancu Court clearly reached the correct conclusion,
the reasoning of its decision is far more labored than the eloquent
Cohen opinion. One might be tempted to credit the historical
context—after all, Cohen’s thoughtful affirmation of constitutional
free speech values concerned a protest to the Vietnam War and was
decided during the height of anti-war protests in 1971. But Justice
Alito takes pains to point out in his concurrence that we too are in
a historical moment when “free speech is under attack.” 22 In many
countries with constitutions or legal traditions that “claim to
protect freedom of speech,” he states, “serious viewpoint
discrimination is now tolerated.” 23 In no uncertain terms, he
includes the United States in his indictment, “such discrimination
has become increasingly prevalent in this country.” 24 If indeed
reaffirming that the First Amendment “does not tolerate viewpoint
discrimination” is no less important today than in 1971, 25 a
19. See id. at 1765.
20. See generally Niki Kuckes, Matal v. Tam: Free Speech Meets
“Disparaging” Trademarks in the Supreme Court, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 122 (2018).
21. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301–02.
22. Id. at 2302–03 (Alito, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2302.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2303.
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historical explanation for the modern Court’s difficulty in writing a
clear affirmation of this free speech principle does not ring true. A
convincing explanation must be found elsewhere.
Iancu vividly illustrates the rigidity, complexity, and
unworkability of modern First Amendment law as it has developed
since 1971. First Amendment law has been compartmentalized
into a series of conceptual boxes, differentiated by the “level of
scrutiny” to be applied (strict, intermediate, rational basis, and so
on). First Amendment analysis now proceeds on the flawed
assumption that all free speech cases can fit into one of these boxes;
in any given free speech case, a great deal of time is spent arguing
over which box is correct. In the Tam-Iancu set of cases, the limits
of that approach become apparent.
Below, this Survey begins in Section I by providing context for
the Court’s Iancu v. Brunetti decision by explaining the significance
of the statutory bar for “immoral or scandalous” trademarks and
the relationship between the Iancu dispute and the Court’s earlier
Matal v. Tam decision. In Section II, the Survey explores some key
difficulties with modern First Amendment law illustrated by the
Tam-Iancu sequence of decisions, and the narrow and
compartmentalized constitutional analysis that modern free speech
doctrine contemplates. Finally, in Section III, the Survey considers
the weaknesses and strengths of the Court’s Iancu decision, and
asks whether, ultimately, the decision should be considered a
disappointment or a triumph.
I.

IANCU V. BRUNETTI: THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT

The Iancu v. Brunetti case arose from the efforts of Erik
Brunetti, an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line,
to federally register the trademark name he used for his clothing
line: “FUCT.” 26 Mr. Brunetti not only used a variation of the same
profanity as had Mr. Cohen in the 1971 decision, but he also
prominently displayed it on clothing to be worn publicly. Beginning
in 2011, Mr. Brunetti pursued an application to place “FUCT” on
the government’s federal trademark registry as his brand for
certain items of clothing. 27 Mr. Brunetti soon ran into difficulty
(albeit not with a criminal prosecution), as described further below.
26.
27.

Id. at 2297.
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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A. The Role of Federal Trademark Registration
When Mr. Brunetti applied to register the trademark “FUCT”
for his clothing line, he was taking the only prudent course for a
trademark owner. The federal government’s trademark
registration scheme, in place in its current form since 1946, allows
individuals, businesses, and groups to secure nationwide legal
protection for their trademarks by registering them with the
PTO.28 The Court dryly describes federal trademark registration
as offering “valuable benefits.” 29 Both the majority and dissenters
emphasize that a seller can use a brand name as a trademark
without federally registering it, and that unregistered marks still
enjoy some legal protection outside of the federal scheme. 30 While
this is technically true, no business with aspirations to distribute
its products nationwide could possibly afford to rely on state law
protection alone for its trademark. Such a business would be at a
severe disadvantage against competitors with federally registered
trademarks and at the mercy of opportunists who could seek to
piggy-back on the success of an emerging brand.
The Supreme Court’s technical descriptions of the
consequences of federal trademark registration might suggest to
the reader that registration under the Lanham Act provides a series
of procedural benefits that are desired by trademark holders, but
that federal registration is not necessary. The Court begins its
opinion by noting that registration is not “mandatory” and that the
holder of an “unregistered trademark may still use it in commerce
and enforce it against infringers.”31 The Court goes on to list
certain (mainly procedural) “benefits” that flow from trademark
registration (registration is treated as “prima facie” evidence in
litigation that the trademark is valid, registered trademarks can
28. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2012).
29. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753
(2017) (noting that federal registration “confers important legal rights and
benefits on trademark owners who register their marks”) (citation omitted).
Justice Sotomayor, in partial dissent, downgrades the consequences of federal
registration to merely providing “several ancillary benefits” to trademarkholders. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
30. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; see also id. at 2308, 2316, 2317
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id. at 2297 (majority opinion).
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gain further defenses by the opportunity to achieve “incontestable”
status, registered trademarks can get government assistance in
halting the import of infringing goods, and so on).32
What can get lost in that list of “benefits,” to a reader
unfamiliar with trademark law, is that the most valuable aspect of
federal registration is not procedural but substantive: It is only by
achieving federal registration for a mark that the trademark owner
gains nationwide legal protection for that mark. The very genesis
of the federal trademark registration scheme was the congressional
recognition that leaving trademark protection to State common law
had become an impediment to creating a truly national economy. 33
Trademark rights, left to State law, had become “uncertain and
subject to variation in different parts of the country.” 34 Given the
important role played by trademarks in promoting fair competition
and maintaining product quality, Congress determined that “a
sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive
nationally the greatest protection that can be given them.” 35
Using its powers under the Commerce Clause, Congress
enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 specifically to “provide national
protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign
commerce.” 36 Without federal registration, a trademark owner
cannot get nationally effective legal protection for a mark. Instead,
he is entitled to exclusive use of the trademark only in the limited
local areas where he has actually used the mark, and is relegated
largely to the patchwork of State law trademark protections decried
by Congress in 1946 as inadequate. 37 As important, without the
nationwide protection conferred by Lanham Act registration, once
a particular brand begins to enjoy commercial success, a
“competitor can swoop in and adopt the same mark for the same
goods in a different location.” 38 In short, federal registration is
essential for any serious business with aspirations to market goods
nationally (in other words, for any business).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 2297–98.
Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).
Id.
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 6 (1946)).
See id.
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
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Describing federal registration as beneficial but not necessary
because the trademark owner can still sell goods under the
trademark is like describing car registration as beneficial but not
necessary: Unregistered cars can still be driven on private property,
and are simply barred from using public roads, but this scarcely
makes car registration optional in any meaningful sense. As the
Federal Circuit has emphasized, the legal consequences that flow
from federal trademark registration are “now so significant as to
make federal registration indispensable for any owner making an
informed decision about its trademark rights.” 39 The Lanham Act
is more properly understood—like car registration—as a regulatory
scheme with important public purposes that operates through a
registration process rather than a “benefit” scheme for trademark
owners (a point that becomes important for First Amendment
purposes, as discussed later). 40
B. The Bar on Registering “Immoral or Scandalous Marks”
Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “used in
commerce” and are capable of identifying the source of a product
These
are presumptively entitled to federal registration. 41
requirements relate directly to the Act’s dual purposes of protecting
consumers’ interest in purchasing known goods and protecting the
investment of trademark holders in the quality of their brand. 42
The statute also specifies certain circumstances in which
trademarks will not be registered. 43 Many of these statutory bars
similarly relate directly to the Act’s goals; trademarks will not be
registered, for example, if the proffered mark is so similar to a mark
already registered that it would “cause confusion,” cause “mistake,”
or “deceive.” 44
However, the Lanham Act also has a “hodgepodge of
restrictions” that bar registration for other reasons. 45 It was one of
those restrictions that proved problematic in Mr. Brunetti’s case:
39. Id. at 1341.
40. See, e.g., id. at 1346 (“Trademark registration is a regulatory
activity.”).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012).
42. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
43. See § 1052.
44. § 1052(d).
45. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329.
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The statutory bar that directs the PTO to refuse registration to
“immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks.46 That wording has an
antiquated air, and it may come as no surprise that the provision
originated as part of trademark legislation adopted by Congress in
1905.47 As it appears in the Lanham Act, the bar says that
registration may be refused to a trademark that “[c]onsists of or
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 48 Despite the
statute weaving those restrictions together, the PTO has long
treated “deceptive” marks as a separate type of bar, and treated
“immoral or scandalous” marks as a single category (often simply
termed the “scandalousness” bar). 49
To determine whether a trademark application should be
rejected on the “scandalousness” basis, the PTO must determine
whether a “‘substantial composite of the general public’ would find
the mark scandalous, defined as ‘shocking to the sense of truth,
decency or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving
offense to the conscience or moral feelings . . . or calling out for
condemnation.’”50
Alternatively,
the
PTO
may
prove
scandalousness by establishing that a mark is “vulgar.”51 Vulgar
marks are also described as “lacking in taste, indelicate, [and]
morally crude.” 52
“Disreputable”? “Lacking in taste”? Shocking to “the sense of
truth”? If anything, the subjective terms supplied by case law are
even broader than the statutory language. The cases can hardly be
said to limit the breadth of the statutory terms or provide helpful
guidance. This may well be an impossible task. The PTO’s
administrative trial tribunal has itself noted that the guidelines are
“somewhat vague” and the decision whether to reject a mark on
“scandalous” grounds is “necessarily a highly subjective one.”53 The
46. § 1052(a).
47. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §5(a),
33 Stat. 724, 725).
48. § 1052(a).
49. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that
the PTO treats the bar as a “unitary provision” that it refers to as the “immoral
or scandalous provision”).
50. Id. at 1336 (quoting In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
51. Id. (citing Fox, 702 F.3d at 635).
52. Id. (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
53. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1990 WL 354546 at
*1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 1990); see also Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1354.
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Federal Circuit, looking to the history of trademark applications
considered under the statutory bar, made the frank observation
that it could not “discern any pattern indicating when the
incorporation of an offensive term into a mark will serve as a bar to
registration and when it will not.” 54
C. The Inevitable Fate of Mr. Brunetti’s Trademark “FUCT” in
the PTO
Given this panoply of subjective terms, Mr. Brunetti’s case did
not prove difficult. The examining attorney found the trademark
“FUCT” to be the “past tense of the verb ‘fuck,’” and denied the
trademark registration as a “vulgar” word. 55 That decision was
affirmed on appeal with the PTO by its administrative tribunal,
which found “FUCT” to be both “highly offensive” and “vulgar,” with
“decidedly negative sexual connotations.” 56
Mr. Brunetti thus joined a long line of trademark owners whose
applications for registration had similarly been rejected over the
years as “immoral or scandalous.” 57 In the 1930s, the PTO found
“scandalous” and refused registration to such marks as
“MADONNA” for wine and “QUEEN MARY” for women’s
underwear. 58 Eighty years later, by contrast, the “BLUE NUN”
was considered acceptable for wine.59 Instead, the PTO’s “immoral
or scandalous” rejections included marks such as “BULLSHIT” for
beverages, “1-800-JACK-OFF” for adult-oriented telephone
conversation services, and “THE BEARDED CLAM” for restaurant
services.60
Given the breadth of the statutory language, such rejections
were by no means limited to profane or sexually suggestive marks.
54. Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1354.
55. Id. at 1337.
56. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019). The Board also
relied on the “anti-social” and “nihilistic” content of Mr. Brunetti’s website as
support for its rejection. Id.
57. In an excellent and very thorough article, authors Anne Gilson
LaLonde and Jerome Gilson documented the PTO’s history of granting and
denying marks challenged as “immoral or scandalous.” See Anne Gilson
LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be
Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1488–1533 (2011).
58. Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1336 (citations omitted).
59. See BLUE NUN, Registration No. 3754794.
60. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57, at 1541–42.
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An in-depth study of the history of the statutory bar found a “wide
variety of trademarks . . . implicated by the ban on registering
scandalous and immoral marks, from religion and political imagery
to sexual matter, profanity and illegality.” 61 Thus, the PTO
rejected as “immoral or scandalous” trademarks with political
messages that it read to suggest support for the terrorist group alQaeda (“BABY AL QAEDA” and “AL QAEDA” for t-shirts). 62 The
PTO also deemed “immoral or scandalous” trademarks it deemed to
convey approval for or “glamorize” drug use (“YOU CAN’T SPELL
HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC” for pain-relief medication).63
Even to the untutored eye, a statutory standard that invites
government officials to decide whether particular words or terms
are “immoral or scandalous” and should thus be denied a legal
status poses evident free speech concerns. But the Federal
Circuit—which hears all appeals from registration denials by the
PTO—had until recently taken the position that the First
Amendment was not implicated by the Lanham Act’s statutory
bars.64 As recently as 2011, trademark law experts predicted that,
while legally problematic, the statutory bar to registering “immoral
or scandalous” trademarks was unlikely to lose a First Amendment
challenge any time soon. 65 By the time Mr. Brunetti’s First
Amendment challenge reached the courts, however, the timing
proved opportune.
D. The Back Story: The Slants Test the First Amendment Waters

The groundwork for Iancu v. Brunetti, as noted, had already
been laid two terms earlier in the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment decision in Matal v. Tam.66 Tam involved a free
speech challenge to another statutory bar to federal trademark
registration—the bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks
61. Id. at 1510.
62. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300–01 (2019).
63. Id. at 2300.
64. See In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
65. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57, at 1531 (“All challenges to the
validity of Section 2(a)’s ban on scandalous marks on the basis that it violates
the First Amendment have met a brick wall that is unlikely to crumble any
time soon.”).
66. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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(those that disparage persons or groups). 67 Simon Tam named his
band, made up entirely of Asian-Americans, “The Slants” as a way
of reclaiming an ethnic slur. 68 He then applied to register “THE
SLANTS” as the trademark for his band’s musical services.69 After
determining that this term was considered disparaging by many of
Asian descent, the PTO refused to register “The Slants” as a
trademark for the band. 70 Mr. Tam challenged the statutory bar
on First Amendment grounds.71
The Tam case may have involved an obscure band name, but
notably, the very same issue was also confronting a far betterknown and highly valuable trademark—the team name for the
Washington Redskins. The “REDSKINS” trademark had just been
cancelled by the PTO after many years of federal registration, on
the ground that the term was “disparaging to Native Americans.” 72
That case was making its way through the courts in the Fourth
Circuit at the very same time as Mr. Tam’s free speech challenge
was being decided by the Federal Circuit. 73 It was, in a sense, a
perfect storm for First Amendment concerns over trademark
registration.
The Federal Circuit used this opportunity to reconsider and
reverse its longstanding position that the bar on registering
“disparaging” trademarks presented no First Amendment issues.
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit struck down the statutory bar
as an unconstitutional burden on private speech in a decision that
generated no less than five opinions arguing over the correct
constitutional approach. 74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (prohibiting the registration of
trademarks that “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contempt, or disrepute” any
“persons, living or dead”).
68. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080
(T.T.A.B. 2014) (cancelling the “REDSKINS” trademark for being
“disparaging” to Native Americans).
73. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va.
2015) (affirming PTO’s cancellation of “REDSKINS” trademark), vacated, 709
F. App’x 182 (per curiam) (4th Cir. 2018).
74. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Tam, 137 S.
Ct. at 1754–55 (summarizing the “assortment of theories” expressed in the
opinions generated in the en banc Federal Circuit decision).
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as is its practice when a federal circuit court invalidates a federal
statute on constitutional grounds. 75
The most remarkable thing about the Supreme Court’s ensuing
decision in Tam was that even though all participating Justices
agreed that the bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks was
unconstitutional—and even though all agreed further that the
constitutional flaw was that the Lanham Act provision unlawfully
authorized “viewpoint discrimination” against private speech by
government officials—the eight Justices participating could not
reach agreement on any single articulation of a rationale for the
Court’s decision. 76 In writing for the majority in the later Iancu
decision, Justice Kagan highlights that oddity, noting that the
Court “could not agree on the overall framework for deciding the
case” even though there was “common ground” for a “core postulate
of free speech law: The government may not discriminate against
speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” 77 As noted, I have
also written at length on the puzzling breakdown in the Matal v.
Tam decision. 78 It was against this background that Iancu came
up for review before the Supreme Court.
E. The Iancu v. Brunetti Court Finds a Majority Where the Matal v.
Tam Court Failed

Given a second chance in Mr. Brunetti’s case, with artful
drafting by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court was able to not only
agree that the statutory bar on registering “immoral or scandalous”
trademarks fails under the First Amendment but also reach
common ground on why it does so. To garner the support of six

75. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (“As usual when a
lower court has invalidated a federal statute, we granted certiorari”). In Matal
v. Tam, the lawyers for Pro-Football took the unusual step of asking the
Supreme Court to bypass the federal appellate process and take certiorari in
the REDSKINS case before the Fourth Circuit had ruled, along with the
Supreme Court’s consideration of THE SLANTS trademark application. The
Supreme Court denied that request. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 137
S. Ct. 44 (2016). However, Pro-Football did participate as amicus curiae in
Matal v. Tam. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (citing to Pro-Football amicus brief).
76. See generally, Kuckes, supra note 20, at 134–56 (noting the areas of
agreement and disagreement among the three plurality decisions in Matal v.
Tam).
77. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99.
78. See generally, Kuckes, supra note 20.
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Justices, Justice Kagan wrote a narrow opinion concluding that the
statutory bar suffers from exactly the same free speech flaw as the
bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks: “[i]t is viewpointbased.” 79 To reach that conclusion, Justice Kagan does a masterful
job of emphasizing those aspects of the case that make the issue
seem, indeed, indistinguishable from Tam. The statutory provision
at issue in Iancu empowered government officials to reject a legal
status to trademarks which are found “immoral or scandalous.” 80
When is expressive material “immoral,” Justice Kagan asks? When
it is “inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals” or
“opposed to or violating morality.” 81 That Lanham Act provision,
she concludes, thus permits registration of marks that “champion
society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that
denigrate those concepts,” which can only be described as viewpoint
discrimination.82
The statutory term “scandalous,” Justice Kagan goes on, is
likewise defined as material that “giv[es] offense to the conscience
or moral feelings” and “call[s] out condemnation.” 83 That means,
once again, that the Lanham Act provision allows registration of
marks “when their messages accord with, but not when their
messages defy, society’s sense of decency or propriety.” 84 That is
viewpoint discrimination once again. “Put the pair of overlapping
terms together,” and what you find, she concludes, is that the
statute on its face distinguishes between two opposing ideas: “those
aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to
them.” 85 Trademarks that induce “societal nods of approval” are
favored, but those that provoke “offense and condemnation” are
disfavored.86 The statute burdens messages that express offending
viewpoints and favors those with positive or innocuous points of
view (thus, she predicts, “HATE RULES” will not be registered as
a trademark, but “LOVE RULES” will). 87 Justice Kagan finds the
79. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.
80. Id. at 2298.
81. Id. at 2299 (citing dictionary definitions).
82. Id. at 2299–300.
83. Id. (alterations in original) (citing dictionary definitions).
84. Id. at 2300.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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same flaw in the PTO’s record of applying the statute. Looking to
the record of granting and rejecting trademark applications under
the statutory bar, she concluded that the facial viewpoint bias in
the statute has also led to viewpoint-discriminatory application.88
To support that conclusion, she selects an interesting set of
examples from the (voluminous) administrative record. 89
Recall that the statutory bar on registering “disparaging”
trademarks, struck down in Tam, had on its face allowed marks
that commented positively on a group but barred marks that
commented negatively on (that is, “disparaged”) the same group.
Thus, the PTO allowed the registration of trademarks that made
positive comments about an ethnic or religious group but refused
registration to marks that were hostile to the same group. The
trademark “ASIAN EFFICIENCY” was registered but “THE
SLANTS” was not. The trademark “THINK ISLAM” was approved
for registration but “STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA”
was rejected.90 In Tam, those results followed naturally from the
statutory language. Because “disparaging” is by definition the
opposite of “praising,” the statutory bar in Tam was inevitably
applied in a way that discriminated between marks that expressed
positive and negative views on the same topic. 91 In a pithy
example, Justice Kennedy observed in his plurality opinion in Tam
that if the government’s defense of the PTO’s ability to reject
“disparaging” trademarks were constitutional, “a law would be
viewpoint neutral even if it provided that public officials could be
praised but not condemned.” 92 Using an example of a law that
would obviously be constitutionally indefensible, he showed starkly
the problematic nature of the “disparaging” trademarks bar.
In crafting the majority opinion in Iancu, Justice Kagan picked
examples to illustrate that the bar on “immoral and scandalous”
trademarks worked in just the same manner as Justice Kennedy’s
example above. She emphasized that the PTO, applying its
88. Id.
89. See id.; see also LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57 (detailing an
extensive history of the PTO’s application of the “immoral or scandalous”
statutory bar).
90. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
91. See id.
92. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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“scandalousness” inquiry, had allowed the registration of marks
that conveyed an anti-drug message (such as “SAY NOT TO
DRUGS – REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE”) but refused
registration to marks that glamorized drug use (such as “YOU
CAN’T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC”). 93 Trademarks
that supported religious faith were registered (such as “PRAISE
THE LORD”) but those with an anti-religious or blasphemous
message were rejected (such as “BONG HITS 4 JESUS”). 94
Differential treatment by the government of private speech on the
same topic, depending on whether it is critical or laudatory, does of
course constitute obvious and unconstitutional “viewpoint
discrimination.” As Justice Kennedy observed in Tam, the key flaw
in the bar on “disparaging” marks is that within a single category,
“an applicant may register a positive or benign mark but not a
derogatory one,” a consequence that is “the essence of viewpoint
discrimination.” 95 Justice Kagan’s close adherence to the common
ground among the Tam pluralities charted a wise course and clearly
succeeded in garnering a strong majority for a clear statement of
First Amendment law (a result that an eight-member Court could
not achieve two years earlier).
At the same time, the Iancu v. Brunetti majority opinion
glosses over some broader issues. The truth is that many of the
trademarks rejected by the PTO under the “scandalousness” bar
express no viewpoint at all. Can a trademark like “FUCT” really
be said to express a “view” on any particular issue? The mark was
rejected not because it expressed a viewpoint, but because it was
found “vulgar.” Mr. Brunetti was trying to create shock value for
his brand not by expressing a viewpoint criticizing anything in
particular but by using shocking language. Even still, the
government regulating private speech because it has found it
“offensive” or “distasteful” should be as abhorrent to First
Amendment values as classic viewpoint discrimination. That
insight, expressed so well and so naturally in the Cohen decision in
1971, was lost in the cautious structure of the Iancu majority, as
discussed further below.
93. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2300.
94. Id.
95. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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II. WHAT THE IANCU-TAM CASES REVEAL ABOUT MODERN FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

Together, the splintered decisions in Tam and the more
successful resolution of virtually the same issue in Iancu shed a
spotlight on the problematic nature of current First Amendment
free speech doctrine. That problem can be highlighted by a simple
question: How could it be that in Tam, eight members of the Court
unanimously agreed that the Lanham Act provision at issue
violated the First Amendment, but could not agree why? Justice
Kagan explained the answer well: In Tam, the Court could not
agree on an overall framework for deciding the case because “no
majority emerged to resolve whether a Lanham Act bar is a
condition on a government benefit or a simple restriction on
speech.” 96 This brief note about whether trademark registration is
a “government benefit” hints at a much larger First Amendment
debate. Justice Kagan succeeded in Iancu by crafting a narrow
decision that largely managed to sidestep that debate.
The challenge faced by Justice Kagan in Iancu was to write an
opinion that avoided the need to characterize the nature of
trademark registration. Otherwise, the decision would have
become mired in a set of very difficult questions: Should trademark
registration be viewed as a type of “limited public forum”? 97 Or is
it more accurate to say that the government’s decision to publish a
trademark in the federal registration database transforms the
trademark into “government speech”? 98 If not, should trademark
registration instead be seen as a “benefit” akin to those addressed

96. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99.
97. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07
(2001) (describing the free speech principles applicable to private speech in a
“limited public forum”); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (explaining the Court’s “forum-based” free
speech framework).
98. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)
(recognizing the principle that “the Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate
government speech”). In Matal v. Tam, there was consensus among the
Justices on this point at least—that trademark registration does not turn a
private trademark into “government speech.” See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760
(stating for the Court that “[t]rademarks are private, not government,
speech”).
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in the government spending cases? 99 Or is a trademark more
properly characterized as “commercial” speech that the government
may more readily regulate? 100 The Tam decision foundered on
these very issues. It was disagreement among the Justices about
how to characterize trademark registration, and which line of First
Amendment free speech cases to invoke, that resulted in the lack of
a majority opinion in Tam. The unsatisfactory state of First
Amendment free speech law is highlighted, once again, in the Iancu
decision. First Amendment law presented a series of shoals that
Justice Kagan would need to navigate if she was to hold together a
majority, as explained further below.
A. The Rigid “Taxonomy” of Modern First Amendment Free
Speech Law
Both Iancu and Tam illustrate that a great deal of time and
energy is spent in modern First Amendment free speech cases
arguing over which of the legal “boxes” created by the Supreme
Court is the proper category. Justice Breyer lamented this in his
separate opinion in Iancu, urging the Court to “place less emphasis
on trying to decide [how] the statute at issue should be
characterized” and more time focusing on the “values the First
Amendment seeks to protect.” 101 As he pithily observed, “[t]he
First Amendment is not the Tax Code.” 102 That was an apt
observation. The free speech guarantee in the First Amendment is,
of course, addressed to governmental restrictions on private speech.
Such restrictions can take many forms. A city rule that requires a
permit to hold a rally in a city park is a government rule restricting
private speech (though perhaps permissibly), as is a federal agency
regulation that bars or requires certain terms in advertising for
drug
products.
A
statute
criminalizing
fraudulent
99. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S.
205, 214–15 (2013) (explaining the principle that Congress, in enacting
spending programs, can impose speech-related restrictions to ensure funds are
used for the activities it wishes to subsidize).
100. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980) (articulating the free speech doctrines applicable
to government regulation of “commercial speech”).
101. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2304–05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 2304.
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misrepresentations is another restriction on private speech (though
certainly permissible). Many, many more examples exist, reflecting
the wide gamut of legal contexts in which government rules may
result in restrictions on private speech.
Rather than create a general constitutional principle to cover
the full range of free speech cases, the Supreme Court has created
separate free speech rules for particular categories of cases. Courts
tend to apply these doctrines quite rigidly and formalistically.103
As Justice Breyer observes, the Court tends to “deduc[e] the
answers to First Amendment questions strictly from categories,” an
approach he believes to be misguided.104 Even more important
than the categories themselves is the consequences that flow from
choosing the category. Depending on which First Amendment “box”
is deemed to be most apt, the Court’s weighing of the government
and private interests—the degree of scrutiny—will differ
significantly.
B. The Real Issue: What Balancing Test is Dictated Here?
In certain relatively rare circumstances, the Supreme Court
does not engage in any interest balancing. At one end of the
spectrum, the Court has held that certain speech does not enjoy any
First Amendment protection. In areas where the need for
government control is most evident, the Court has simply declared
that certain private speech is not protected by the First Amendment
at all; speech in that category includes fraudulent statements,
obscenity, and “fighting words.”105 Excluding such speech from
constitutional protection eliminates any First Amendment
challenge to statutes that criminalize fraud and validates other
governmental schemes where the Court concludes that the private
speaker has no legitimate interest while the government’s interest
is great (such as obscenity).
More often, however, the Court has created separate lines of
authority dictating the particular balancing test to use in a given
setting to weigh the private speaker’s right to speak with the
103. See id. at 2304 (arguing that the Court has sometimes applied free
speech rules “too rigidly,” especially those related to “content discrimination”).
104. Id. at 2305.
105. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that the
government may properly ban obscenity and “fighting words”).
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government’s interest in restricting, burdening, or barring that
speech. How to strike the appropriate balance for a particular
setting has been a continuing challenge, particularly given the
Supreme Court’s relatively recent expansion of free speech
protections to commercial speech (previously put in the category of
speech that had no First Amendment protection). 106 The most
significant factor in these decisions—significant, that is, in terms of
being outcome-determinative—is the “level of scrutiny” dictated by
a particular line of free speech cases.
Will the government simply be expected to articulate some
reasonable interest (to which the courts will generally defer)? Or
will the courts closely scrutinize the government’s reasons for
restricting speech (putting a thumb on the side of the scales for the
private speaker)? It is said, with some accuracy, that a “strict
scrutiny” test is “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” 107 On the other
hand, so-called “intermediate scrutiny” tests can have the opposite
problem, that of excessive deference to governmental interests. The
development of varying levels of scrutiny in First Amendment free
speech cases has, not surprisingly, led to fierce battles about in
what “box” any given free speech restriction should be placed, since
the Court’s preliminary decision about how to categorize the case
will determine the level of scrutiny (and ultimately, predict the case
outcome). Justice Breyer explicitly describes the Court’s lines of
First
Amendment
authority
as
“outcome-determinative
categories.” 108
C. Avoiding Landmines in Drafting the Iancu v. Brunetti
Decision
Justice Kagan could not simply draft an opinion treating the
case as a straightforward application of the principles recognized in
Cohen. She had to find a route that would avoid the disagreements
that would inevitably arise from any attempt to characterize the
106. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496–
500 (1996) (describing the evolution of commercial speech doctrine).
107. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (referring
to the notion that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’” while
seeking to dispel it).
108. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2304, 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting the Court’s tendency to treat its “speech-related
categories . . . as outcome-determinative rules”).
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Lanham Act’s statutory bars by explaining where the case fit within
the existing First Amendment “taxonomy” (and what level of
scrutiny followed). One particular First Amendment “box” was
already off the table: The Court in Tam had sensibly rejected the
argument that private trademarks accepted for federal registration
become a type of “government speech” (giving the government full
leeway to decide which trademarks to endorse or reject). 109 The
government is obviously not endorsing a trademark’s message
when it grants a trademark registration, simply making the
determination that a particular mark meets the requirements of
federal law and putting the public on notice of the registration
decision. As Justice Alito aptly put it, “if trademarks represent
government speech, what does the Government have in mind when
it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), to ‘Think different’
(Apple), to ‘Just do it’ (Nike), to ‘Have it Your Way’ (Burger
King)?” 110 By the time Iancu arrived at the Court, it was clear at
least that “[t]rademarks are private, not government, speech.” 111
Instead, there was heated debate over a closely related
argument: whether trademark registration should be seen as a type
of “government benefit” program, thereby bringing the case within
the line of First Amendment law establishing that the government
can decide which speech activities it wishes to “subsidize” in
funding such programs. 112 Federal trademark registration is often
said to confer important “benefits” on trademark owners.113 It may
seem tempting to invoke the government benefits line of free speech
cases as the right “box” for the case. In Iancu, for example, both
Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor, writing in partial dissent,
relied heavily on the notion that the government can legitimately
decide to not provide the “benefits” of trademark registration to
scandalous, offensive, and vulgar trademarks without violating free

109. See Matal v. Tam,137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–60 (2017).
110. Id. at 1759.
111. Id. at 1760.
112. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S.
205, 214–15 (2013); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (noting that the
“government is not required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to
promote”).
113. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753.
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speech rights. 114 However, the type of “benefits” addressed in those
cases involve “cash subsidies or their equivalent.” 115 Insofar as
beneficial legal results follow federal trademark registration, these
are more aptly described as the “legal consequences” of registration
than as “benefits” in the sense used in those cases. Trademark
registration is a routine government regulatory scheme, not a
spending program involving the type of “cash” benefits or grant
funds at issue in the “government benefits” cases. Whatever her
own views on the propriety of treating trademark registration as a
government “benefit,” however, Justice Kagan could not wade into
this controversy without risking losing her coalition. As Justice
Alito emphasized in his plurality in Tam, the First Amendment’s
“government benefits” doctrine presents a “notoriously tricky
question of constitutional law.” 116
Some Justices urged the Court instead to treat trademark
registration as a type of “limited public forum,” a designated
government channel for private speech in which the government
has power to ensure that the forum is used for its intended
purposes, such as a school’s internal mailbox system. 117 But the
only arguable “forum” in the trademark registration program is a
public online database listing those trademarks approved for
federal registration (along with a docket disclosing the history of

114. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the government should be
able to “disincentivize” the use of offensively worded trademarks by “denying
the benefit of trademark registration”); see also id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the trademark
registration system “confers a small number of non-cash benefits on
trademark-holders who register their marks” and that the government “need
not provide this largely commercial benefit at all”).
115. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761.
116. Id. at 1760.
117. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–
46, 49 (1983) (noting that “[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is
the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity . . . . These distinctions . . . are inherent and inescapable in
the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the
intended purpose of the property”); see also Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2305
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
case should be treated as “a limited public forum”).
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The database of federal
each trademark prosecution). 118
trademarks is more akin to a court’s online docketing system than
a forum for private communication. If such databases create a
“limited public forum” for private speech, then there are
innumerable other such forums, including not only court and
agency case docketing systems but also government databases
listing car registrations, professional licensing, registered
corporations, and the like. Are registrants really “speaking”
(presumably to each other) in such a database? This argument is
untenable.119
Yet another First Amendment “box” urged upon the Court as
the correct analogy for trademark registration was the line of First
Amendment authority related to “commercial speech.” 120 Where
the commercial speech analysis applies, the government is subject
to less exacting scrutiny of its conduct and governmental
restrictions affecting speech are more likely to be upheld. However,
major controversy swirls over the proper application and reach of
the commercial speech doctrine. What should be considered
“commercial speech,” and in what settings the doctrine should
apply is a matter of debate. Initially, the Supreme Court defined
“commercial speech” as speech that “propose[s] a commercial
transaction.” 121 Thereafter, the Court spoke somewhat more
broadly of commercial speech as “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 122 But, “the
line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always
clear.” 123 Speech can be both political and economically motivated
(for example, an editorial in a newspaper) or both economically

118. See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database [https:
//perma.cc/Y293-JD6K] (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
119. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (seeing only a “vague resemblance” between trademark
registration and a “limited public forum”).
120. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980) (articulating the free speech doctrines applicable to
government regulation of “commercial speech”).
121. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
123. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
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motivated and political (for example, a public service
announcement made by a drug company). The difficulty of applying
the “commercial speech” doctrine is evident. Trademarks, for
example, are not necessarily related “solely” to the speaker’s
economic interests, but instead can be both highly expressive and
related to commercial activity. The trademark at issue in Matal v.
Tam was a prime example: Simon Tam chose “The Slants” as his
band’s trademark to send a message about discrimination against
Asian-Americans. 124
As Justice Alito emphasized in Tam,
“trademarks often have an expressive content.” 125 Moreover,
Justice Alito highlights a deeper problem with invoking the
“commercial speech” cases in a way that would allow the
government to cleanse such speech of “offensive” content. As he
observed in Tam, if “affixing the commercial label permits the
suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social
‘volatility,’ free speech would be endangered.” 126
After reading the numerous opinions in both the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court in the two cases taking a wide
variety of positions on how trademark registration should be
characterized, the bottom line is best stated by Justice Breyer in his
partial dissent in Iancu: “This case illustrates the limits of relying
on rigid First Amendment categories” since trademark registration
“does not fit easily into any of these categories.” 127 Given the stark
disagreements among the members of the Court on how to
characterize the trademark registration program for First
Amendment purposes, Justice Kagan had to find a way to draft an
opinion that did not require going through that step. She did so by
narrowly analyzing the case as one of “viewpoint discrimination”
and making clear that no balancing of the government’s interests is
required in any setting once this conclusion is reached. Her
approach succeeded in holding together an unusual assortment of

124. Id. at 1751 (noting that while “The Slants” is a “derogatory term for
persons of Asian descent,” the “band members believe by taking that slur as
the name of their group, they will help to ‘reclaim’ the term and drain its
denigrating force”).
125. Id. at 1760.
126. Id. at 1765 (plurality opinion).
127. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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conservative and liberal Justices to make a majority, 128 though one
still senses that the decision is held together with string and tape.
The limitations and benefits of her approach are explored further
below.
III. IANCU V. BRUNETTI’S SOLUTION: FLAWS AND BENEFITS IN A
VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
When the Supreme Court decided Tam, as noted, deep
divisions over the proper direction of free speech doctrine divided
the Court and made unity impossible, even though the eight
Justices all agreed both on the core principle and on the case
outcome. By the time the Iancu decision was issued, Justice Kagan
had of course taken over the drafting pen. With participation by
two new Justices (Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh), she convinced
six members of the Court to join a single opinion holding that the
Lanham Act bar on registering “immoral or scandalous”
trademarks should be struck down as unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. To reach that outcome, however, Justice Kagan
finessed several significant issues that, had they been engaged,
might well have unraveled the majority.
A. Hints That a Viewpoint Discrimination Lens is Not Entirely
Satisfactory
In particular, the Court avoided answering two central
questions: First, is Mr. Brunetti’s “vulgar” trademark
constitutionally entitled to free speech protection? And second, can
this case really be analyzed based only on viewpoint
discrimination? Asking these questions yields interesting results.
1.

Are “Vulgar” Trademarks Constitutionally Protected?

The dissenting Justices express a shared sense of offense at the
vulgarity of Mr. Brunetti’s “FUCT” trademark (and similar or
worse marks) and the idea that the PTO would have to register
trademarks of this ilk. Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, predicts a
“coming rush” of trademark owners seeking to register “the most

128. Id. at 2294. The majority consisted of Justice Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice
Kagan.
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vulgar, profane or obscene words and images imaginable.” 129
Justice Roberts cannot imagine reading the First Amendment’s free
speech right to “require the Government to give aid and comfort to
those using obscene, vulgar, or profane modes of expression.” 130
The majority does not engage on this issue, other than to emphasize
that the Lanham Act’s “scandalousness” bar “covers the universe of
immoral or scandalous” material, and is not limited to vulgar or
profane speech.131 Ironically, given that Mr. Brunetti’s “FUCT”
trademark was rejected on the ground that it was “vulgar,” the
majority opinion expresses no view as to whether “vulgar”
trademarks are protected by the free speech guarantee. It steers
entirely clear of the hot-button issue of “vulgar” material.
Instead, the Court emphasizes the statute as a whole, finding
that the “statute, as written, does not draw the line at lewd,
sexually explicit, or profane marks.” 132
The examples of
trademarks that the majority opinion uses as illustrations, notably,
do not include a single one that would be considered vulgar. 133
While this case involves a facial challenge, the omission is still
striking. Rather than talk about “vulgar” trademarks, Justice
Kagan uses stirring analogies, comparing the case to a statute by
which the government purported to ban “subversive” speech
(clearly unconstitutional). 134
The majority’s avoidance of any direct engagement on the issue
of “vulgarity” reflects the very cautious steps needed to avoid
plunging the Court back into the disputes that precluded
agreement in Tam. Notably, the government had invited the Court

129. Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding the government to have “at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that
it is not involved in promoting highly vulgar or obscene speech”).
131. Id. at 2301 (majority opinion).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 2300–01. The Federal Circuit was more direct in openly
analyzing the many examples of (and flaws in) the statute as applied to vulgar
marks such as “FUCT.” See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1352–55 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (emphasizing that the “government does not have a substantial interest
in protecting the public from scandalousness and profanities”). The Federal
Circuit’s decision devotes an entire page to analyzing the PTO’s inconsistent
treatment of trademarks like “FCUK,” “FUGLY,” “ROLL TURD,” and “MILF”
(an acronym for “moms I’d like to fuck”). Id. at 1354.
134. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2302.
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in Iancu to adopt a “limiting construction” by reading the “immoral
or scandalous” statutory ban as limited to marks offensive “because
of their mode of expression, independent of any views that they may
express.” 135 In essence, the government would have read the ban
to bar only trademarks that express their message in a vulgar,
lewd, profane, or sexually explicit manner (such as Mr. Brunetti’s
brand-name).136 There was already precedent for rejecting that
position. The Cohen Court had explicitly and definitively rejected
the same argument: It held that the “mode” of expression—in
Cohen, using profanity as part of a political message—is protected
as much as the content of speech. 137 But Justice Kagan chose not
to engage on this issue either with the dissenters, who believed that
this narrower reading would be both reasonable and
constitutional,138 or with concurring Justice Alito, who urged
Congress to amend the statute to limit it to “vulgar” trademarks. 139
To take on that issue would have led the Court into the very interest
balancing it was trying to avoid. Consider, for example, the reading
proposed by Justice Sotomayor, who urged that at least as to the
bar on “scandalous” trademarks, the Lanham Act could reasonably
be read “to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.” 140
Notably, however, only one of these three types of speech—
obscenity—has been held to lie outside of free speech protection
altogether.141 As Cohen makes clear, in contrast to obscenity,
vulgar and profane words like “Fuck the Draft” may indeed enjoy
135. Id. at 2301.
136. Id.
137. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
138. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that “[p]rohibiting the registration of obscene,
profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, contentbased regulation”).
139. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito, who joined the
majority, also wrote separately to emphasize similarly his belief that Congress
could amend the statute to “preclude[] the registration of marks containing
vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.” Id.
140. Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that a narrowed reading of the statute “would save it from
unconstitutionality”); see also id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (concluding likewise that “refusing registration to obscene,
vulgar or profane marks does not offend the First Amendment”).
141. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 485 (1957) (holding that
“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”).

2020]

SUPREME COURT SURVEY

107

free speech protection.142
Limiting the statute as Justice
Sotomayor proposes would not, in fact, have made the
constitutionality inquiry easier. Instead, it would have led the
Court down the same rabbit hole it fell into in Tam.
What government interest could possibly sustain the
constitutionality of a statute burdening “vulgar” speech? Chief
Justice Roberts proposes one: barring the registration of obscene,
vulgar or profane trademarks would be adequately supported by
the government’s interests in “not associating itself with
trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar or profane.” 143 In
other words, the government should be able to treat vulgar speech
differently because it does not approve of vulgar speech. Such a
circular rationale is not usually an adequate justification for First
Amendment purposes.144 Rather than take on the issue, Justice
Kagan (wisely perhaps given the context) simply states that “even
assuming” the government’s reading would eliminate First
Amendment problems, it is simply not a reasonable reading of the
statutory language. 145 Thus, the question that is not aired in the
majority opinion is how such a “narrowing reading” could possibly
be constitutional. Can it really be that Congress can freely
regulate, prohibit or burden private speech on the ground that it
includes swear words (particularly in a setting outside of schools or
captive audiences)? “Vulgarity” may be distasteful, but it does not
fall into any category of speech that does not enjoy First
Amendment protection, such as obscenity, fighting words, and
fraudulent or deceptive speech. The Supreme Court in Cohen had
no difficulty in discerning that penalizing a speaker for using
vulgarity to express a message (such as “Fuck the Draft”) is not a
constitutional means of regulating speech.146 That frank and direct
acknowledgement of the sometimes difficult truths that flow from
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee is missing from
142. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (emphasizing that “[t]his is not . . . an
obscenity case”).
143. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
144. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (finding “plainly untenable” the
“general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may
properly remove [an] offensive word from the public vocabulary”).
145. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
146. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
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Iancu. The Cohen case also involved a facial challenge to the
California statute penalizing “offensive” speech, and the Court
directly confronted the import of its holding: messages expressed
in profane language are protected by the First Amendment no less
than messages using conventional political terms. 147 Indeed, the
Cohen Court emphasized that using profane language can be part
of creating a powerful impact for the message, noting that “words
are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force.” 148 In Iancu, by contrast, the Court emphasizes the facial
aspect of the constitutional challenge, and steers clear from the
“FUCT” trademark that sparked the challenge.
While pragmatic, the majority’s strict focus on the facial
challenge to the statute has an odd, though unstated, result: Mr.
Brunetti wins without ever receiving any affirmation that his own
profane trademark is actually constitutionally protected speech. By
contrast, the Court did not shy away from the analogous issue in
deciding Cohen in 1971. While acknowledging that the answer may
not seem “obvious” from the case before it, given the broader
implications of its ruling, the Court flatly held that vulgar but
peaceful speech, such as Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket,
cannot constitutionally be restricted on the ground that the
government, or some part of the public, finds that the message uses
an “offensive word.” 149 No such clear or direct engagement with
the underlying issue of the individual challenger can be found in
the Iancu decision. That judicial reticence has an odd result: If
Congress were to take up Justice Alito’s invitation, and rewrite the
statute to bar only the registration of trademarks that include
“vulgar” terms, the Iancu majority decision would not explicitly
address the constitutionality of such a revised statute. It is entirely
possible that the Court will be presented with yet another
constitutional challenge in its Tam-Iancu sequence if Congress
takes up the invitation to rewrite the Lanham Act.
If “Round Three” of the dispute follows, a revised Lanham Act
will directly call upon the Court to say whether a statutory bar
written to preclude only the registration of “vulgar” marks is
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 26.
149. Id. at 25; see also id. at 15 (noting that while this “case may seem at
first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it
presents is of no small constitutional significance”).
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unconstitutionally “viewpoint discriminatory,” since it is hard to
see what “viewpoint,” if any, vulgar terms are expressing. As
Justice Breyer observed in his separate concurrence, it is “hard to
see how a statute prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar
or obscene words discriminates based on ‘viewpoint.’” 150 The issue
of the Supreme Court’s insistence that “viewpoint discrimination”
is the real flaw in the Lanham Act’s “scandalousness” provision is
taken up in turn below.
2.

Is “Viewpoint Discrimination” the Real Problem Here?

Justice Kagan does a masterful job of fitting this case into the
“viewpoint discrimination” box in the modern free speech
taxonomy. The concept of “discrimination” inherently suggests that
the government is treating two similar groups differently, 151 and
her opinion highlights the ways in which the PTO discriminates in
registration between those trademarks whose message offends
public sensibilities (“BABY AL-QAEDA” for t-shirts) and those
whose message accords with public values (“PRAISE THE LORD”
for a game). 152 The analysis worked well (or would have worked
well) in Tam, because the concept of a “disparaging” trademark is
inherently viewpoint-discriminatory. The statutory term
“disparaging” itself dictates that the PTO look to the message of the
trademark and discriminate based on viewpoint; those trademarks
that “disparage” a group will be refused registration, while those
that praise the same group will be registered.
Can the same really be said for the bar on “scandalous” marks?
Is discrimination based on viewpoint inherently required by this
statutory term? 153 Or is there a deeper issue here? While the Iancu
majority selects examples that reveal discrimination based on
150. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
151. Most aptly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines discrimination as follows:
“Differential treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no
reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not
favored.” Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
152. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2300.
153. The dissenters agreed that a bar on “immoral” trademarks constitutes
viewpoint discrimination, but would have found a bar on “scandalous”
trademarks constitutional. See id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that it is “with regard to the word ‘scandalous’
that I part ways with the majority”).
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viewpoint, an even greater problem has been the PTO’s
inconsistency and subjectivity in applying the statutory test. 154
There are two issues with respect to subjectivity in the agency’s
pattern of applying the relevant part of the Lanham Act. First,
what was “considered scandalous as a trademark or service mark
twenty, thirty or fifty years ago may no longer be considered so,
given the changes in societal attitudes.” 155 Thus, the statutory bar
to federal trademark registration presents an uncertain and
moving target for trademark owners. Second, even within the same
era, different trademark examiners may come to different
conclusions about what is “immoral or scandalous.” Studies
comparing data concerning the treatment of similar trademark
application requests have found the PTO’s decision making erratic
and unpredictable. 156 Consider the acronym “MILF” (which is
apparently a well-known shorthand for the phrase “Mom(s) I’d Like
to Fuck”).157 A 2011 study looked at trademark registration
applications that included “MILF.” As of that date, a remarkable
total of forty-one applications had been filed seeking to register
trademarks that included the term; of those applications, twenty
were rejected as “immoral or scandalous” for using the term MILF
while the other twenty were not.158
Even considering that different products may have been
involved, this data clearly suggests inconsistent application of the
same legal standard by different government officials (which would
scarcely be surprising). It is hard to reconcile, for example, why
“MILF MAGNET” would be granted registration as a trademark for
athletic clothing but “MILF GOLF” would be rejected as a

154. See LaLonde and Gilson, supra note 57, at 1477 (noting that the PTO
has “no independent standards that apply to such determinations, which are
made by dozens of different individuals of varying political, religious,
geographic and family backgrounds”).
155. Id. at 1495 (quoting In re Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216
(T.T.A.B. 1993)).
156. Consistency is also retarded by PTO guidelines, which specify that a
registration decision rejecting a particular trademark as “immoral or
scandalous” has no precedential value for later registrations even when the
very same terms may be at issue. See id. at 1477–78.
157. Id. at 1478.
158. Id. These included such marks as “WANT MILF?,” “GOT MILF,”
“MILF MAGNET,” “DIARY OF A MILF,” “MILF HUNTER,” “MILF
CLOTHING,” “MILF MATERNITY WEAR,” and so on. Id.
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trademark for women’s golf apparel. 159 The risk of varying,
standard-less, and subjective applications of the statutory standard
seems clear.
As the foregoing reveals, there is an issue here that goes
beyond “viewpoint” discrimination: Government officials should not
be empowered to award or withhold an important governmental
status to a person based on an officials’ subjective judgment about
whether or not a person’s speech is “scandalous” or offensive (even
if the speech expresses no particular viewpoint, or the plaintiff
cannot show disparate treatment). By limiting the issue to one of
viewpoint discrimination, the majority in Iancu accomplishes a
critical step in the First Amendment logic. If the regulation at issue
discriminates based on speakers’ viewpoints, it is unconstitutional,
period. There is no need to look at the reasons the government
offers to support the regulations. That is so because it is impossible
to come up with a neutral reason for adopting a viewpointdiscriminatory regulation. To defend a government rule that bans
or burdens a viewpoint, the government must argue one of two
things: either the viewpoint at issue is one that the government
opposes, finds offensive, or does not support; or the viewpoint is one
that members of the public oppose, find offensive, or do not support.
Neither reason is a “viewpoint-neutral” rationale—that is, a reason
for the rule that has nothing to do with the viewpoint being
suppressed. If the Iancu decision finesses certain key questions, at
the same time, it does advance First Amendment law by making a
clear statement on the doctrine of “viewpoint discrimination.” 160
Below, the strengths of Iancu are considered.

159. Id. at 1479–80.
160. The Court has, without expressly saying so, adopted a view closely akin
to that of Justice Thomas in Tam. There, he said that viewpoint discrimination
is unconstitutional, period, in whatever setting it occurs. See Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (noting that “when the government seeks to restrict truthful
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate,
whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial’”
(quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
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B. Strengths and Enduring Themes in the Iancu v. Brunetti Decision

While narrow, and subject to the critiques outlined above, the
Iancu decision accomplishes several important things.
Not
insignificantly, Justice Kagan takes a constitutional issue that was,
if anything, more difficult than the issue in Tam and brings
together a solid majority in favor of a clear First Amendment
holding. This was the point on which the Tam Court failed.161 In
Iancu, the Court endorses in clear terms the constitutional
principle that “if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based,
it is unconstitutional.” 162 The Court describes as a “core postulate
of free speech law” that “[t]he government may not discriminate
against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.” 163
Because it finds the Lanham Act’s bar on registering “immoral or
scandalous” trademarks to be viewpoint-based, the Court concludes
that the statute cannot withstand a First Amendment challenge; to
paraphrase the Court, the “finding of viewpoint bias end[s] the
matter.” 164 By so stating, the Court has clearly situated viewpoint
discrimination as a circumstance that requires no balancing (and
no need to characterize the law at issue on the free speech
spectrum). Whatever the setting, a finding that a government
restriction on private speech is viewpoint-discriminatory ends the
analysis. There is no need to consider the government’s “interest”
in the provision because there can be no legitimate government
interest in suppressing a particular viewpoint. In that sense, the
case bookends the Court’s approach to categories of speech like
obscenity, which likewise requires no balancing, though for a
converse reason.
The decision is also well-drafted in that it leaves room for a
broader understanding of viewpoint discrimination. The classic
terms used in First Amendment law, “viewpoint discrimination”
(and the related term, “content discrimination”), are misnomers in
many ways. The concept of viewpoint “discrimination” suggests

161. See Kuckes, supra note 20, at 167 (arguing that Tam presented a “rare
circumstance[e] in which a law on its face violates the Free Speech Clause” and
that the Court “missed an opportunity to make a clear statement of this narrow
but fundamental point of law”).
162. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2302.
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that there should be disparate treatment of different speakers
based on the viewpoints they express (this idea is the focus of the
majority’s decision in Iancu). More broadly, the concept would be
better described not simply as addressing discrimination by the
government among private speakers, but also encompassing
discrimination against any particular private speaker based on the
government’s
opposition
to
the
speaker’s
message.
“Discrimination” is a poor term to capture the constitutional
concept at stake.
A statute that allows government officials to withhold a legal
status to which speakers are otherwise entitled on the ground that
the government finds their speech to be “immoral or scandalous” is
a clear violation of the First Amendment. This is exactly what the
Lanham Act does. But the problem is not simply that the
government cannot treat different speakers differently, depending
on the view they want to express (though this is certainly true). The
problem, more fundamentally, is that the government cannot
suppress the private speech of even one person simply because it
finds that person’s speech offensive, undesirable, socially
unacceptable, distasteful or vulgar. It was Justice Frankfurter who
wrote that American citizenship carries with it the “right to criticize
public men and measures—and that means not only informed and
responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without
moderation.” 165
Fortunately, Iancu is drafted to lay the
groundwork for a broader understanding of the flaws in what is
currently denominated “viewpoint discrimination.” While the
principal focus is on “viewpoint discrimination” in the narrow
sense, the decision also contains the groundwork for a holding, in a
future case, that the doctrine is broader. That is an issue that will
certainly arise if Congress takes up the invitation to amend the
Lanham Act to bar the registration of “vulgar” trademarks.
Another challenge that faced Justice Kagan was drafting an
opinion that reconciled the differing views between Justice Alito
and Justice Kennedy as to exactly what the “viewpoint
discrimination” problem was in the Lanham Act statutory bar

165. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (quoting Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–674 (1944)).
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cases. 166 In Tam, Justice Alito’s vision of “viewpoint
discrimination” was a broad one. He argued that the First
Amendment cases “use the term ‘viewpoint’ in a broad sense” and
that “giving offense is a viewpoint.” 167 In the plurality portion of
his opinion, he invokes case law from the Cohen era holding flatly
that “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers.” 168 Justice Kennedy, more narrowly, argued in Tam that
the “essence of viewpoint discrimination” occurs when the
government has “singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based
on the views expressed.” 169 His focus was on the fact that the
government allowed the registration of a “positive or benign mark
but not a derogatory one.” 170
Justice Kagan incorporates both concepts into the Iancu
majority opinion. The examples she gives are in line with Justice
Kennedy’s focus (allowing the registration, for example, of
trademarks that celebrate religion but not those that criticize
religion). But the decision also contains broader language. The
Iancu decision states, for example, that “as the Court made clear in
Tam, a law disfavoring ‘ideas that offend’ discriminates based on
viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment.” 171 It speaks as
well of the unconstitutionality of a statute that “aim[s] at the
suppression of views.” 172 Those statements may prove key if there
is, indeed, a “round three” in the litigation over the Lanham Act
statutory bars.
CONCLUSION

In the end, one must admire Justice Kagan’s feat of discipline,
careful drafting, and leadership in Iancu v. Brunetti in summoning
a decisive Court majority for a clear (if narrow) statement of First
166. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (comparing the different approaches
taken by Justices Alito and Kennedy with respect to the application of
“viewpoint discrimination” in Tam).
167. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion).
168. Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
169. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
170. Id.
171. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
172. Id. at 2302.
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Amendment law. As this Survey shows, her task was considerably
harder than in Cohen in 1971, where the Court could readily and
broadly declare the unconstitutionality of a statute that allowed a
speaker to be punished simply for publicly wearing a jacket stating
“Fuck the Draft.” By 2018, despite the similarity of the issues—a
private speaker’s rights with respect to government restrictions on
“vulgar” speech (here, the trademark “FUCT”)—the resulting
decision is considerably narrower. In the five decades since Cohen
was decided, the development of First Amendment law into a highly
compartmentalized “taxonomy” of numerous, distinct strands of
legal doctrine has increased disagreements within the Court in free
speech cases. 173 In this era, it is quite frankly puzzling as to how
to analyze a Free Speech case that does not fall neatly into one of
the pre-existing categories. The problem with that approach
becomes acutely evident in cases like Iancu and Tam.
The existing First Amendment categories simply do not work
for every case. At the same time, there is no overarching First
Amendment free speech doctrine that ties the “taxonomy” together
and supplies rules for cases not readily characterizable. The
Court’s struggle to fit the Lanham Act statutory bars into the
existing First Amendment case law is a clear illustration of the
problem. Justice Kagan wisely recognized that the case could and
must be decided without delving into the difficulties of First
Amendment free speech doctrine. Indeed, to include a foray in that
direction might have made mustering a clear majority impossible.
To that end, the Iancu decision is disciplined, tight, clear, and
narrow. It does the needed job even if in certain respects it may be
criticized as incomplete. Is the decision a disappointment or a
triumph? Skillfully drafted or overly cautious? Forward-looking or
limited in scope? While only the future will determine the answers
to those questions, Justice Kagan is to be commended for
successfully rallying a majority for a decisive and sound First
Amendment decision.

173. See id. at 2314–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (contrasting the “taxonomy” of free speech terminology that is commonly
used today with the approach 1971, when Cohen was decided).

